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PA NEWSLETTER

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**A DAY IN THE LIFE:
LIVING ON MY OWN
IN GENERAL-NEEDS HOUSING
JONATHAN ARMSTRONG**

Alone
Loneliness
Space to “spit on the floor” and relax
Space to deeply heal and strengthen
Quiet
Space to party
To have people over
To work out what work I can do
To learn to love my own company
To pray and meditate
Sanctuary
Fear
To separate out from controlling-influences
To take shelter in my disposition
To live on.....

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




Image: Jonathan Armstrong

ORIGAMI EILEEN LY

Hello, my name is Eileen and I'm an origami addict. A few years ago, someone gave me a bird-themed origami kit. Unfortunately, that person got me hooked. With many diagrams and instructions being freely available, I can spend a hideously large amount of time folding a single model. On average it requires at least two hours of sweat, tears, sudden and inexplicable bouts of Tourette's. There's something godlike about folding animals out of paper. For someone who doesn't feel superior in very many aspects of life, it's a brilliant feeling. Complex models can be frustrating and I've encountered many failures, but the achievement of successfully creating something beautiful is well worth the effort.





Photos: Eileen Ly

**DOROTHÉE BONNIGAL-KATZ AND THE
PSYCHOSIS PROJECT
AMANDA FERROZHA**

I met Dorothée approximately eighteen months ago and also more recently at the UKCP-CPJA conference in April 2018, where she was talking about her Psychosis Project. Founded in 2013, the project offers long-term psychoanalytic therapy to people with the experience of psychosis. The project is based at Islington Mind and another pilot was launched in 2017 in south London.

Dorothée talked about the benefits and challenges of working in such a project with people quite often deemed unsuitable for psychotherapy.

The diagnosis of schizophrenia has socio-economic consequences, as people diagnosed as such will quite often be on long-term benefits and so fit into an underclass, meaning no one cares too much about you because you are deemed not fit for purpose or useful in society. This project's aim is to do something about this situation, not in a patronising way but in a deeply respectful way.

Dorothée's stance is one of "just do it", and in practice she goes beyond the role of psychotherapist quite often. The reality of what is done therapeutically goes beyond psychoanalysis because it has to.

She talked about the relational model based on Freud's technique of:

- abstinence
- truthfulness
- radical suspension of "ego gratification"

This is the ideal (in my opinion) of getting rid of therapeutic ambition and goals for the patient and of wanting to "help". Dorothée's stance is not one of pure neutrality, but of not being indifferent. There was a debate around whether one could be purely "neutral" and not want things for the patient. Why is this relevant to the issue of psychosis? In Dorothée's view, there is no room for two in psychosis – there is always an "other" who can potentially threaten and think for you. It is about not imposing on the "other" and this is easily done with

those who are deemed psychotic, as the delicate fragile psychic entity can so easily be wiped out.

In the world of the psychotic there is a fragmented reality and no subject/object in the world, and maybe not even a human being in the world.

It is necessary, in Dorothee's opinion, to suspend the need to find some kind of egoic meaning, to impose meaning and create a "murderous dyad" where only one can exist or be, a fight to the psychic death.

Debate ensued at the conference as to whether the therapist could be truly abstinent and not want anything for the client. Some thought this was too idealistic. There was talk also of the seeming "battle" with the hegemony of the NHS and its demand for "autonomy" which is perversely tied to funding. The question "what does it mean to get better?" came up. Is it possible to let the patient decide?

There is a punitive approach to the patient's lack of compliance. Violence underlies the ideology of "getting better" – and also, in my opinion, the Recovery Model, which seeks to find/impose meaning on the patients' experience as a means of "recovery".

I think Dorothee's work bravely goes against the grain of the mental health system and challenges it at its heart, i.e. its punitive and sometimes controlling manner in which it insists on some kind of recovery but in the end becomes just another political statement ... on behalf of whom? Not the patients. Her work is a counter to the oppressive need of the mental health system to make everyone well/fit (in) whatever that means. But which might mean conforming with the norms of what is deemed sane/acceptable by the institution, which is of course not very normal and sane itself! And to fit into what is acceptable to it and its budget, i.e. how much are the "mentally ill" worth in today's society?

How much do we value the experience of psychosis as opposed to seeing it as an expression of mental illness?

**THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSORTIUM:
A COLLABORATION OF
FELLOWSHIP AND THINKING
LAKIS GEORGHIOU**

I have been involved in the organising committee for the Consortium for a couple of years now. The Consortium is currently made up of:

- Philadelphia Association (PA)
- Site for Contemporary Psychoanalysis
- Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research (CFAR)
- Association of Group and Individual Psychotherapy (AGIP)
- Cambridge Society for Psychotherapy
- Guild of Psychotherapists.

This original link came into fruition for the purposes of fostering among the organisations' trainees a sense of community and a meaningful discourse regarding theory and praxis. The group was also united and successful a few years ago in representing opposition to registration of

psychotherapy under the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC).

When I was a trainee we had joint clinical presentations within the Consortium organisations (as far as I remember these events were held on Saturday mornings). The PA Training Committee are now considering revisiting these joint clinical presentations.

The idea is that on a once-per-term basis, a trainee from one organisation would play host with his peers and tutor to present some clinical work for thirty minutes followed by a facilitated discussion. After a break, a trainee from a visiting organisation would then present in the same way, followed by discussion.

The cross fertilisation of thinking and ideas offered me the opportunity to learn, reflect and share with the other training group as well as my own. This community of peers came to symbolise for me a tolerance and respect for all modalities of the work. There is strength in numbers and without peer support and recognition, work as a psychotherapist can sometimes feel quite isolating. Seeing trainees offer each other a welcome can be both stimulating

as well as heartwarming. Conversations are always a valuable building block for us all in this work.

Next PA training year an invitation has been sent to all trainees of the Psychoanalytic Consortium to participate in the annual Training Study Day on Saturday 16 February 2019. This year we are asking trainees to take the lead with organisers offering only facilitated discussions. The idea is that four trainees from each organisation present something to share with others. It would be for twenty minutes in small groups followed by a facilitated discussion of ten minutes. It could be a segment of written work they have prepared for their training, a book review, an exploratory reflection of theory/philosophy, a clinical vignette or indeed any experience that proved formative.

Every Christmas one organisation would again host a party. Such music-filled and boozy evenings at Marty's Yard were in the past really inclusive and often would have Introductory Course students, trainees, tutors and members of all the organisations dancing to Nick Putman's richly eclectic mix of Eighties, blues and jazz rhythms. How great it would be to return to this experience! Any takers to help organise for this end of year?

CAN WE SPEAK OF ETHICS? INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SUFFERING?

MILES CLAPHAM

A cry of distress cannot be greater than that of one human being.

Or again no distress can be greater than what a single person can suffer. Hence one human being can be in infinite distress & so need infinite help.

Someone to whom it is given in such distress to open his heart instead of contracting it, absorbs the remedy into his heart.

Someone who in this way opens his heart to God in remorseful confession opens it for others too. He thereby loses his dignity as someone special & so becomes like a child. That means without office, dignity and aloofness from others. You can open yourself to others only out of a particular sort of love. Which acknowledges as it were that we are all wicked children.

It might also be said: hate between human beings comes from our cutting ourselves off from each other.

Because we don't want anyone else to see inside us, since it's not a pretty sight in there.

Of course you must continue to feel ashamed of what's within you, but not ashamed of yourself before your fellow human beings.

There is no greater distress to be felt than that of One human being. For if someone feels himself to be lost, that is the ultimate distress.

Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*

This remarkable cry from Wittgenstein, written in 1944, seems to me to call for a response in thinking about what we might call ethics. Wittgenstein's cry, I say cry because these words, so eloquent, have such heartfelt power, may not be obviously ethical; Wittgenstein is

saying it is the person herself who must respond – “the person to whom it is given in such distress to open his heart instead of contracting it” – it must be given to that person to open his, or her, heart, perhaps not to another person, but to some other force, Wittgenstein says God. It is worth noting, although there is not the space here to show this, that going by Wittgenstein's other remarks in “Culture and Value”, his understanding of “God” is not what most orthodox religions would accept. It is very much in line with a *via negativa*, or negative theology, which does not refer to or depend on any kind of concept or particular view of God, indeed eschews fixed views and theory.

Wittgenstein, writing during the Second World War, imagines

someone, himself, myself, needing infinite help. Is this the helping hand of the stranger, or something different, for the one who feels himself to be lost, in the ultimate distress? He offers little comfort, you must continue to feel ashamed of what is within you, but not before your fellow humans, because each of us is equally burdened with wickedness inside. Wittgenstein too locates the source of hatred for others here, in our shame at our own guts.

Wittgenstein in part of what he says seems to echo Lamentations 1: 12: “O, all you who walk by on the road, take heed, and see if there be any sorrow like my own sorrow. Take heed, all you people, and regard my sorrow.”

This too might suggest a need, even a demand for help, yet it is not necessarily that. The person calling out wants his/her suffering to be regarded, to be looked at, perhaps to be acknowledged. Is there any sorrow like mine? Only I can have sorrow like this, a common cry in our own time. “How can you know what I am going through, you’re not me!” although this is not the intention of Lamentations. Is it only the individual person we must acknowledge? Certainly we must start somewhere. Ai Wei Wei’s film *Human Flow* conveys the immensity of the world wide refugee crisis, 65 million people displaced by war or famine in the last eighteen years. He shows both the terrible scale of the disaster, and how it is each individual who suffers and requires

respect and succour. One person’s story shows both dimensions, a Syrian man shows the seventeen ID passes of his family who left Syria, the graves of five of them dug in the earth behind him. All have suffered this together, and a collective grief and understanding of the loss is part of this, even though one person is talking for the others.

This collective suffering can be shown by many examples; one comes from Australia. I have just been to Alice Springs and met an indigenous man working with local people, who sees that so called “mental health” problems often stem from the multiple traumas Aboriginal people have suffered since the arrival of Europeans in 1788. According to research, the initial and fundamental trauma that spread faster than the

racist treatment resulting from Captain Cook’s declaration of *terra nullius*, which stated the land was empty of humans before white people, was disease. 50–60% of the indigenous population died from diseases such as tuberculosis, small pox, “flu”, even the common cold, which while introduced by the colonists, moved much faster than white settlers. This meant that apart from the trauma of a huge death toll, orphaned children or bereaved parents, many elders died, who held the law and ritual containing immense “knowledge” in their stories and “song lines”, which were cultural, spiritual, geographic, agricultural, and water source “maps”, leaving aboriginal people bereft of their ancient understanding of the land (stretching back at least

30,000 and perhaps 60,000 years or more, which is unimaginable cultural continuity from a Western perspective).

There is huge argument in Australia, politically and among anthropologists who try to understand what is happening culturally and historically, as to the sources of the “suffering” of the Aboriginal people, which ranges from massive alcohol and substance abuse, to child sexual abuse and domestic violence with huge rates of imprisonment. There is argument too about the use of the word suffering, and whether classical anthropologists ignored child abuse and violence that went on in front of them as somehow “cultural”. Now, since the infamous “Intervention” (in the Northern Territory), possessing a can of beer

in a prohibited area can lead to a six-month prison sentence, for whites and blacks, but the law is aimed at Aboriginal people who largely make up the prison population. In Alice Springs an armed policeman stands outside the wine shop, and I was refused when trying to buy wine as I had no ID.

A different take on this comes from my working as a Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist, usually seeing parents and families as part of the “assessment” and the therapeutic work with the young person, which I continued to do although surrounded by an increasing trope of so-called “bio-medical” or neuropsychiatry. (What is “bio-medical”?) Recognising the connections between one person’s pain and those around her, and the social,

educational, environmental, political and financial context he or she is trying to live in was part of the job, although it is impossible to deal with all of it, making focusing on one person so much easier. Bio-medical psychiatry seems mostly to want to focus on a decontextualised brain, and avoid engaging with any of the mess that our society constructs around or piles on top of people’s lives.

POLITICS OR ETHICS?

Aristotle categorised three domains of human activity as “practical sciences”: ethics, economics and politics. Practical, because they involved practice, and did not have a fixed endpoint, they were always a work in progress. They were different from productive sciences

which had a product as an endpoint – agriculture hopefully produced a good crop. Ethics, politics and economics all involve how we live, and how we relate to each other, how the community or the nation functions, and what sort of relations there are among nations and other large groupings – they are aimed at “the good life” which is not a material product. They are not really separable, Han for example in his *Psychopolitics* talks of the “subject” in neoliberal economies becoming a slave to him- or herself in the project of self-manufacture, transparent to the world on social media, all desires already algorithmically known and responded to with advertising, with his or her aims to perfect the self, body and soul, and show the world an endless sequence of delighted

selfies. But basically to be a slave and consume the endless production of postmodern capitalism, keeping a tiny number of people fabulously rich and removed from the lives of “ordinary” people.

Sveiby (2006) talks of “intangibles” in economics; enjoyment of a landscape, friendship, feeling valued as a person, or having a sense of purpose can be thought of as “intangibles”. They may be considered as “goods”, and may result from ethical or economic practice, but are left out of classical economic calculations. These “intangibles” can link economics with politics with ethics. An example comes from the Tigray area of Ethiopia which has a massive “regreening” project to mitigate climate change and the degradation

of agricultural land by overgrazing and deforestation. Introducing indigenous agricultural practices back into the project meant local people felt more connected with the project which enhanced community relations in the work involved. More generally, if people have a sense of purpose and feel valued this could mitigate against the epidemic of depression and anxiety western countries are suffering from. A question is, how do we get this sense of purpose, and what would our purpose be, when we are surrounded by concern over climate change, wealth and gender inequality, a global refugee crisis and so on? What of the suffering of “one human being”? Many young people I have seen are caught up in such questions.

Glover's book *Humanity: The Moral History of the 20th Century* calls for a response to the terrible things we humans can do to each other. He details many of the atrocities of the twentieth century, Stalin, Hitler, the Holocaust, Pol Pot, Kosovo and the rape camps, Hiroshima, the fire-bombing of Hamburg and Dresden, Rwanda. He states that ethics needs to be more empirical, quite how he does not say. He does not accept entirely, although he does in some circumstances, the relative body count as some form of measure or justification. Was Stalin being responsible for twenty million deaths worse than the Holocaust with six million deaths? How do we think of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with a relatively "low" 300,000 deaths, although many of them died in a

single instant? Numbers don't tell us how dreadful something is, and numbers of dead cannot be an empirical way to judge the ethics of some mass murder. Glover seems to accept, in war, that if some "innocent" civilians die in an operation that may save many others, this action can be justified. However, this argument was used to justify the nuclear bombs being used against Japan; Glover is less happy with that. We are more likely to see this as a war crime now, or at least as one more of the horrors inflicted by men on other people.

Counting deaths does not help us, indeed immediately gets us into trouble. Can we just add up suffering? Many will say the Holocaust was especially terrible, regardless of the relative numbers

killed, because of the way it was carried out, the cold bloodedness of it, the methods used. Yet there are many examples throughout history of horrific cruelty inflicted by men on others. Spending Semana Santa in Seville, and seeing some of the Pasos with Jesus carrying the cross, or crucified, one is thrown to this image that has been so powerful in Western culture, of the Christian God dying in agony. With Wittgenstein's words ringing in our ears, "no distress can be greater than what a single person can suffer", we focus on the suffering of this one particular person. Does this translate to the person in front of us? Arguably, if one focuses on the suffering of Jesus, one can become diverted from the suffering we do find in front of us. Or ask the suffering person to turn to

Jesus for salvation, not to me. Jesus suffering is supposed to save us, although not from the suffering of this world, only from suffering in the next, but that is eternal!

Our problem, faced with Syria for example, or Yemen, or Somalia, is how can we deal with each suffering individual in all their need for acknowledgement, and succour? The numbers then become overwhelming. And what of these people's spiritual, or infinite distress, which does not necessarily need bombs, torture or rape to be occasioned?

Glover talks of "the human responses" without questioning this, as something that allows or encourages compassion even in extreme situations. For example a German soldier ordered to shoot a

Jewish woman and her children face to face with them cannot bring himself to do it, and goes off duty "sick". Reinforcing Glover's position is the evidence that Nazi soldiers and the SS had to be trained and indoctrinated to overcome their remorseful or sympathetic feelings. Hitler wanted Nazi youth to love cruelty and destruction, this became some kind of ideal, with all sorts of propaganda used to make soldiers treat Jewish people, Romanies, gays and the mentally ill as sub-human.

Blake in his poem "The Divine Image" says:

**For Mercy has a human heart,
Pity a human face,
And Love, the human form divine,
And Peace the human dress**

Later he offers an alternative version:

**Cruelty has a human heart,
And Jealousy a human face,
Terror the human form divine,
and Secrecy the human dress**

Blake's apparently cynical reversal shows us that whatever ideals we have, that "man" is created in God's "Divine Image", the "dark side" is there and deeply tempting.

Wittgenstein suggests we should acknowledge the ugliness "inside" us, and we should remain ashamed of ourselves for what we are, and are capable of. And then we should deal with each other without office, dignity or aloofness from others.

Wittgenstein asks how we understand pain, and how we know

whether another person is in pain. He asks whether any two people can have the same pain, showing the futility of the question as a philosophical question. I do not “have” your pain. Yet as we all know, in ordinary terms we may well have the same pain. Further, we often do know when someone else is in pain, we don’t have to infer it as various others including Freud have said. From a medical diagnostic point of view there is no mystery, a central crushing chest pain radiating to the neck and/or left arm, accompanied by shortness of breath and terrible fear (angor animi) is pathognomonic of a heart attack, regardless who has the pain. And I the doctor see your pain – I may ask where it hurts but I don’t ask “does it hurt?” in such a circumstance.

Jaspers says, “understanding meaning impinges on myself in the other.” When I understand what something means to you, we might say, I feel it in myself. Not the same exactly, I use imagination or intuition to put myself in your shoes, or to “project” myself into your situation; we use the “countertransference” as some would say. Or rather I do and I don’t, because I cannot possibly imagine what it is exactly like to be in your place. I might try to imagine what it’s like to be dragged off by a lynching party to be hanged, but how can I know the terror, the hurt, the wrongness of it (does one even think of “injustice” in such a moment?) It is difficult to say precisely how one “gets it” in seeing another’s suffering.

Wittgenstein suggests we should be without office, dignity or aloofness from others, then we can open our hearts to the suffering of others. Without office? How are we to be a therapist? This move I want to say, brings us to something ethical. We no longer, if we did before, see ourselves as someone with special knowledge, with a special role, whether analyst, therapist or psychiatrist. Seeing what is front of us is ethics, says Taylor; Heidegger, Wittgenstein and many others have reminded us that seeing what is under our noses, or in our hearts, is the most difficult thing.

THE ORIGIN OF ETHICS?

We could ask, where do we get ethics from, or where do we get compassion from? Are ethics and

compassion the same thing?
Children enjoy seeing people being helped when they are distressed or injured. Some contemporary research suggests this is innate. There has been much research into the evolutionary or genetic aspects of altruism and sympathy for others. Early research cited soldier ants who form a living bridge across water so that the marching colony can cross. The ones forming the bridge drown while the others mostly cross safely – can this have anything to do with altruism in humans? Probably not, it seems more the ethics of a Stalin. Yet there would be good evolutionary reasons for humans to want to help each other. Aboriginal culture was fundamentally collective and emphasized sharing. A purely individualistic, egoistic or selfish

approach to life would quickly dissolve into chaos and the deaths of many. This is illustrated in many of the traditional Aboriginal “dreamtime” stories or *burruguu* (in one first-nation language; it does not translate as dreamtime which is a western interpretation). We see this now in response to climate change, while we have the Paris accord on limiting global temperature rise, countries such as India, China, Australia and United States are going full steam ahead with coal mining and fracking.

Contemporary ethics is confused as to any foundation, any basis that is dependable no matter what. Taylor has given us a moral history of humanity, at least a largely Western or first-world view. He explores in great depth the relation

between our ideas of who we are and some notion of what is good. It is clear that this varies enormously with the time, place and culture. The Western trajectory has mostly had a religious basis, from the Ten Commandments on. As we know, Nietzsche challenged this, predicting, and arguing for, the perishing of Christianity’s “weak” morality which enslaved and enfeebled those it took in. Of course a fundamentalist version of Christianity persists, particularly but not just in the United States, in an extremely unholy alliance with American neoliberal, capitalist supremacism. One side of the anthropological argument for what would help the Aboriginal people in Australia is better induction into the neoliberal economy, so as well as

wanting all the material “goods” available, they would be able to earn the wherewithal to purchase them. Understandably this has provoked furious argument in the anthropological, as well as the wider world.

A code of ethics gives us rules of behaviour, such as not exploiting our patients or clients sexually or economically. It would be mischievous and futile to deny the importance of such rules, but there are other questions, what makes ethics important at all, and is there something else to ethics other than rules, a question to which I assume most would answer yes.

Wittgenstein famously has seemed to say that one can say nothing about ethics, or at least anything one might say about

absolute values would be nonsensical.

In the “Lecture on Ethics”, given in 1929, Wittgenstein quotes Moore, “Ethics is the general enquiry into what is good.” Wittgenstein goes back to basics we might say. He adds various synonyms for what is good – what is valuable, or really important, or that ethics enquires into the meaning of life, or what makes life worth living, or the right way of living. Then Wittgenstein differentiates a relative usage of these terms from an absolute use. So a good chair has a design that works well, or has some feature one likes, a good tennis player is some who can beat someone average, but not a champion. A valuable painting might cost a lot, but its aesthetic value

might be dubious – Wittgenstein interestingly links aesthetics and ethics. What however is a good person? What do we think of Heidegger as a person given he was a Nazi and never repudiated it, indeed in some ways defended it? What does Laing’s alcoholism and sometimes abusive behaviour imply about him as a person or as a teacher of psychotherapy? What does it mean that even psychotherapists are capable of abuse of clients and bullying of colleagues?

Fundamental to the difference is that relative uses of “good” or “right way” can mostly be reduced to some empirical fact – we can look at a map to get the right way to Cambridge, or have a competitions to find the best tennis player. A good table is one that doesn’t wobble and

spill my glass of wine, as Mulhall recently said in a public lecture.

Wittgenstein categorically states that no statement of facts can include any ethical judgement, or any judgement of absolute value. No propositions are in any absolute sense sublime, important, or trivial. Even if we describe a murder, and this might include the emotional effects on people involved, “it would still be facts, facts, and no Ethics.” Wittgenstein concludes that nothing we could ever think or say would be Ethics.

This might not seem to make sense, because if we make an ethical judgement, that in itself is a fact – it is a human action, flawed or not, and the fact of that judgement would need to be included in the world book. Wittgenstein denies that this

would be possible, or that the ethical can be put into a book. The point is I think that even if we include the ethical judgements that have been made as facts, what they were based on is still the problem, and that is what is at stake. Underlining the problem Wittgenstein says: “we cannot write a scientific book, the subject matter of which could be intrinsically sublime, and above all subject matters.” I think it makes sense to say there could not be a science of the sublime, of something “above” everything else, of an ethics that resides in the absolute. Although neuroscientists might be looking for which bit of the brain is active when we make ethical judgements, and as touched on above, there is a lot of research into the evolution of ethics. A lot has been written about the

sublime as well, although trying to leave it as sublime.

Wittgenstein says there could not be a state of affairs that would be the absolute good; or that there is no state of affairs that would have the coercive power of an absolute judge. Would he say the same about the Holocaust or Stalin, given that it is not uncommon for people to say that some act or other is “pure” or “total” evil?

He goes on to give an experience he says tempts us to absolute thinking, that is wonder at the existence of the world, or saying, how extraordinary that this world should exist. Wittgenstein says there is a characteristic misuse of language here: wonder at the existence of the world from a logical perspective is nonsensical. We might wonder at the

nature of nerves in the brain, but to wonder that anything should exist at all makes no sense because we cannot imagine that it should be otherwise. It is impossible to really think or imagine that nothing would exist.

Wittgenstein goes on to say that when we talk in absolute terms we seem to be suggesting a supernatural value. He talks of religion and the allegory of saying that God created the world as a way of expressing the sense that the world, existence, is a miracle. Other examples are feeling safe in the hands of God, or condemned by God as allegorical expressions for feeling of absolute safety (can this happen outside a religious perspective?) or total guilt – immured in original sin.

Seeing the world as a miracle is not a sensible proposition in language, Wittgenstein says the right expression is the existence of language itself. This is not clear to me, except perhaps we could say that language, in its attempt to express anything at all, has at its heart a desire to show the marvellous nature of existence.

Wittgenstein therefore seems to found the impulse to ethics on a mystical experience or epiphany which we cannot make sense of. This echoes what he says in the *Tractatus* about someone to whom the sense of life suddenly becomes clear, being unable to say what that sense was. Such an experience does seem to call for some kind of meaningful or ethical response. Quite how this response is to be shaped is another

question. One can say one should act with kindness towards others, or spend one's life planting trees, or listening to troubled people, trying to help untangle their thoughts. It doesn't seem to translate into banal things like being a good taxpayer, although who knows?

McManus and Mulhall both say that Wittgenstein was concerned with being decent. Being decent for Wittgenstein meant primarily being honest with oneself and to others. McManus sees in Wittgenstein a parallel between his understanding of philosophy, or philosophy's "claptrap", its endless going on in search of ultimate meanings, and the search for "a machine that would make people decent". Wittgenstein is sure he can't achieve such a machine although he had spoken of the

Tractatus as an attempt in this direction (Mulhall, 2018). Religion and politics taken to extremes can become like machines for making people “decent” in a particular mould, the Inquisition and Stalin could be seen as examples, in their trying to purify society of the contemptible ones, the heretics and the disbelievers. Be decent or you will either burn or freeze at the stake, in the gulags, or in Hell. The current unleashing of CBT upon the population can be seen this way too, a psychological machine for making people “decent” neoliberal subjects.

To return for a moment to the starting point. Wittgenstein calls to us, a person can be in infinite distress and so need infinite help. We as therapists cannot give this, and we should beware the temptation to be

perfect therapists, absolutely good. But we can acknowledge – I can acknowledge that I am like a wicked child – and perhaps divest myself of office, of dignity, of aloofness from others. Then perhaps I can open my heart to others. As Seneca says: “Let us practice humanity, for you turn around and death is at your elbow.”

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ON "GASLIGHT"

LAURENCE SEGRAVE

CATHERINE STEVENS

URSULA TROCHE

ROB WHITE

ANDREA HEATH

Gaslight, made in 1944, is a very provocative and interesting film. One of the first films to deal with such complicated, psychological issues and to make the audience explore how manipulation and control can dictate relationships. For this reason I believe that *Gaslight* is very avant-garde and although there are moments that shows its age this in my opinion

does not deter a modern audience from being gripped right to the very end.

Paula, played by Ingrid Bergman, is a character with youth, beauty and innocence. She has had a tortured past and is certainly a wounded soul and in her husband's mind a perfect candidate to manipulate or convince that she is going insane. Gregory Anton, played by Charles Boyer, uses nearly every opportunity to question how well Paula really knows herself using subtle hints and completely isolating his

wife from the real world. He openly flirts with the couple's young maid, Nancy, played by Angela Lansbury, which completely humiliates Paula. Gregory uses Nancy's attraction to him to cause further distress to his wife. Although directed by George Cukor there is a very Hitchcockian feel to this film. It conveys a world dominated by paranoia and mistrust.

Gaslighting has become a fascinating subject to people and although a common enough issue within relationships there are

actually only a few occasions when it is the main focus of a film or any artistic endeavour and I feel that more could be done to highlight how and why it occurs. There is quite a patriarchal feel to *Gaslight*, not just from Gregory but also from Paula's "knight in shining armour", Brian Cameron, played by Joseph Cotten who convinces Paula of Gregory's motives. This is understandable due to the age of the film, however it somewhat gives the impression that a woman can only be saved by a man and is unable to help herself.

This in my opinion is a very minor flaw in the film and I think generally in this period of cinema directors would often heighten women's vulnerabilities to make them more attractive to male audiences.

To conclude, I would highly recommend *Gaslight* as a pioneering film and it's a great watch.

Laurence Segrave

I thought the ending of the film was very powerful where Paula confronted her husband alone, showing that she saw through his

psychological manipulation of her. Her understanding of herself which arose from the integrity she showed in her suffering (she had never lied to her husband), and her grasp of how she had been manipulated, meant that she did not need to stab him. His power over her was gone and she was free. He was then irrelevant, and she could live her life free from the ghosts of the past.

Catherine Stevens

Gaslight is a fascinating, though hard-to-watch film because it showed how

labelling someone as mentally ill can be used to hide a crime. In the film, Paula falls in love with Gregory, and he does just that: he declares her insane so she would not find out he is a murderer. So the insanity label is worse than arbitrary, it's calculated, methodical, a cunning strategy to conceal the truth.

What came to mind for me is that it was an extreme, twisted and sinister version of *Truth and Method*. In this 1960 book, H. G. Gadamer argues that truth and method are at odds with one another (he continues

the thread of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, as "philosophical hermeneutics"). And here Gregory's crime-hiding method is at odds with Paula's uncovering of truth.

Gregory's cruel method includes dividing and ruling women – every time he gets the female housekeeper to collude with him in framing Paula as insane, so that his assertions are never questioned whereas hers are never considered.

Things are only turned around at the very end of the film, where the police reveal his method



Photo: Ursula Troche

and thereby the truth is vindicated.

So the film has a great message, a warning on how to beware of what others may do to you for their own ends. As such, it is also a warning against patriarchal methods, which sometimes operate along similar lines. It can also be seen, I think, as a precursor to Laing's *Sanity, Madness and the Family*, though here in a relationship context. So it's a very good and educational film which could serve as an eye-opener.

Ursula Troche

From the back of the Marty's Yard meeting room it was possible to watch *Gaslight* gripping the thirty-strong audience. With occasional mutters, people sat tensely during Paula's final conversation with Gregory (aka Sergius), or even craned forward as if to intervene in the on-screen action. There was a palpable dread in the room that she might at the last minute be swayed by her deceitful husband – and then, when she didn't, when she instead gave him a dose of his own medicine by denying she

held a knife, there was a collective sigh of relief. The group was able to take a reassuring message from Cukor's film. In the discussion afterwards there was talk of coming to one's senses by, for example, seeing through the fog of political propaganda. But there was also something uncertain and jittery about the group's relief and its confidence that gaslighting could be overcome. As the discussion went on, I started to think about jarring moments in the film. There were the two creepy kisses shared by

the soon-to-be-married couple – what did Paula ever see in this slimy man? There were those grandiosely lit close-ups of Paula at her most miserable which seemed to exude some secret delight in martyrdom. There was the fickle housekeeper, so curiously ready to do the bidding of the American detective: she quickly switches loyalty from the master of the house to the curiously well-connected copper, perhaps because she instantly recognises a new master. When at the end the policeman, Paula's rescuer, waits for her on

the roof of the house there is an uncanny implication that the story might be starting all over again from the beginning – that Paula has found a new vampiric overlord too, and it is only for this reason that she has been able to renounce his predecessor.

These were very suspicious hunches, to be sure. Maybe they even verged on a paranoid reading of the film, but still they raised the possibility that the gaslighting *didn't stop* with Gregory's capture. And maybe the film group was jumpy because

this horrible idea was in the air, but nobody wanted to admit it.

A few years ago I heard a radio interview with an activist woman who had been duped into a relationship by an undercover policeman. They had a child together but all the while he was filing surveillance reports. When the story eventually broke, the woman contacted her former lover to ask for his side of the story. She said he stonewalled her on the phone; he sounded as though he had taken legal advice in expectation of hearing from her, or as if



Photo: Rob White

he was still under orders. The interview conveyed a wrenching sense not only of betrayal but of an untrustworthiness which never ends. I remembered this interview a day or

two after the *Gaslight* screening because I suddenly suspected that the film had gaslighted all of us in that audience about *class*.

In a Scotland Yard scene early in the film the American calls over a tall constable and asks him if he would like to move his beat from the seedy East End to somewhere posher. Of course the constable agrees, and in his new territory he carefully follows his orders to worm his way into the affections of the housemaid Nancy, played with such delicious dislikeability and vulgarity by the young Angela Lansbury. (Known affectionately to all because of *Murder, She Wrote* but what a mesmerising, menacing

actress she could be – watch *The Manchurian Candidate*!) The housemaid likes the constable, she seems to trust him; nothing suggests she knows he is a spy. Nancy has none of the hypnotic pathos and glamour of wretched, lovely Paula so it is easy not to notice at first that she has been gaslighted too. And what that means is that the price of believing in *Gaslight*'s happy ending is to have to ignore both the film's hints of masochism and Nancy's plight.

Rob White

Did you know how much I love you? Is a hope that somehow you can save me from this darkness.

Johnny Cash

Watching *Gaslight* was a truly intense experience. Afterwards my dreams were populated by characters from the film and ghosts from my past. What really stayed with me after the film was something to do with Paula's "hope" for happiness taking her further into the darkness.

Paula suffered unfortunate circumstances. She was

orphaned at birth and witnessed the strangled body of her dead aunt (and guardian) Alice Alquist. In an early scene we see her abandoning her singing career to marry her pianist Gregory after a two-week romance. She tells Maestro Guardi that her heart is not in singing and she is taking a chance at happiness, to free herself from the "fear of something nameless" and the tragedy of her past. She tells Gregory "I've found peace in loving you."

Sadly this really is a case of mistaken

identity as Gregory is not who he seems to be. He has courted Paula with the sole purpose of getting his hands on her aunt's famous jewels, the same jewels that drove him to murder Alice ten years earlier.

As the story continues we witness Paula tantalised by this man who dangles her a lifeline out of grief and a half life. Confining her to the house he toys with her affections, manipulating her into



Image: Andrea Heath

believing that she is fitful, forgetful and acting in peculiar ways, all the time veiled behind expressions of care and concern. He informs her that mother “died in a mental asylum with no brains at all.” As Paula inhabits an increasingly smaller world she begins to lose sight of herself while Gregory coolly looks on as she falls to pieces. Each time he rejects her, she is tipped back into despair and as Paula becomes consumed by fear and self-doubt, we witness the happiness die in her face.

Gregory is clearly a complex character who is compelled to beautiful objects: “they are wonderful things that have a life of their own ... I don’t ask you to understand me. Between us all the time were those jewels, like a fire – a fire in my brain that separated us – those jewels which I wanted all my life. I don't know why ...”

We learn nothing about his past except at the end of the film when he’s revealed to be a bigamist and murderer operating under a false identity.

The servants are bystanders and the underclass in this wealthy household. Nancy appears to despise Paula and want to take her place, sharing saucy looks and intonations with Gregory while Paula looks on undermined, lacking and wanting. The older maid Elizabeth is portrayed as simply subservient. Both servants seem gaslighted by generational longings and the privileges and status of the ruling class.

Gregory’s hold over all the women dissolves once Inspector Cameron enters the scene

and in the end they show no loyalty to him.

Paula’s tentative relationship with Inspector Cameron is disappointing. The final scene hints at a future relationship, perhaps to offer the audience hope, but it undermines the theme. It doesn’t take seriously the consequences of this insidious type of abuse on the women in this household. It perpetuates the idea that women need men to survive and that there is a happy ever after.

Andrea Heath

COMMUNITY
DAVID ANTHONY

It is a grey zone, with ill-defined outlines which both separate and join the two camps of masters and servants

Primo Levi





WHERE'S MY FOUCAULT?

KEVIN BALL

A few years ago I took up the offer to do a presentation on my work on perinatal psychotherapy in the NHS. I was taken aback by one comment made during the discussion. The comment was: “Where’s your Foucault?” This was in response to my engagement with social services in order to help “at risk” mothers to demonstrate that they were capable of forming safe, healthy and affectionate relationships with their babies. The thrust of the comment was that I was shaping these clients into compliant agents of the state in a cohesive power/knowledge axis. I think what struck me about this comment most was that it was precisely because of Foucault and reading his diverse

oeuvre that I had the desire to engage with the public sector in the first place. So much of Foucault’s work explores the architecture, archeology and genealogy of the way in which power and knowledge create discontinuities or epochs in the order of things. However I could not recall which part of Foucault’s work had inspired me. I started worrying about where indeed my Foucault was. This was to begin with a concrete task. In my library I could only find a single volume of his work. I did have a Foucault section which I kept on the top shelf to the left of my bookcase, above my Blanchot, my Nietzsche and my Kierkegaard. I kept Foucault far away from my Heidegger and my Derrida but at least they shared the same bookcase. My Lacan was world’s apart at the other side of the

room, as if Foucault and Lacan had nothing to say to each other – and their physical distance was replicated in my mind. I never thought of them together despite now seeing the connection.

Assembling my Foucault became a Christmas obsession which led to every room in my house. I recovered several useful commentaries in the attic and when I had given up I found most of them tucked away at the bottom of my bedtime reading list. It didn’t help – I still couldn’t find the quote that pointed me towards the public sector. Maybe it was a Foucauldian dream. All I can remember is that Foucault said that in order to change systems you have to work within them. I was never altogether satisfied with being away from large public institutions,

firing pot shots from a distance. So when the opportunity arose to work in the NHS I took it. This satisfied a deeply Derridean urge in me to articulate fully the text when wishing to deconstruct it. Reading Foucault through the lens of Derrida seemed to me to be very Foucault since Foucault didn't like his work being systematized. Perhaps he saw his work being locked into its own "power-knowledge" struggle that he articulated so well. So now that I had found my Foucault books I realised that I had to find *my* Foucault, and thus I freed myself from the burden of having to track down exactly what he said. In this way, the language of the question came to life and I started to enjoy looking for my Foucault.

My Foucault began with reading *Madness and Civilization* and

the wonderful line he often quoted, "develop your legitimate strangeness". He describes the book as the archeology of the silence of the mad. What is striking about the book is that Foucault, although steeped in Heideggerian phenomenology, didn't focus on phenomenology in his account of madness but used history as his method. Why? Because phenomenology at the time was focusing on the individual. What is so vibrant in Foucault is highlighting social discourse, social conversations and their layers, their complexity and how they following clear geomorphological shapes, contours and epochs. He showed their horror and their beauty as if we were staring at a landscape we had never seen before and it is all around us.

I found this hypersensitivity very powerful and could see why being in an atmosphere in the public sector where so many of these discourses collide and engage was a rich terrain to work in. Attending a Herbert Dreyfus seminar on Foucault and Heidegger I remember a fascinating debate between Heidegger's concept of Being and Foucault's concept of power. Dreyfus highlighted that "power" in Foucault functions like "Being" in Heidegger. It is all-pervasive. It is everywhere, it is constitutive and is not a pejorative term. Peter Dews challenges Foucault and reads him backwards through Habermas, raising the hope of a more liberating form of intersubjectivity and not simply one that is inevitably coercive. Testing this out in the public sector has fascinated

me, particularly with a very vulnerable population of mothers with young babies surrounded by discourses on motherhood which span from social discourses to psychoanalytic discourses. In psychoanalysis there is a history of negative constructions and blaming of mothers from Bettelheim's "refrigerator mothers" to From Reichmann's schizophrenogenic mothers, which was carried on by Bateson, so the narrative instead of taking a radical shift was carried on from psychoanalysis to family therapy and systems theory, until the publication of *The Invisible Web*, among others, placed gender at the core of psychodynamic and systemic thinking. One great moment Goldner calls "deconstructing the violent moment".

With mothers particularly, "violent moment" is always potentially there in every discourse but there is also the moment of liberation from it too. Adding a psychoanalytic twist, there is always the risk in institutions, and I am thinking specifically of perinatal work, of systemic countertransference where the internal struggles become pervasive in the whole system, where the poor communication and coercive dynamics in the system surrounding the clients' context becomes replicated in the professional system. I have found that, rather than seeing power as fundamentally coercive, the the power of the consulting room, the professional view can be formed with the client and can begin a powerful dialogue with the social-care system

that challenges the discourses circulating.

In one case, when I was doing parent–infant therapy, the mother said "I wish social services could see this" in a mixture of anger and tears. As a single mother with six children, the social worker had felt the children needed a father. Oh, Foucault, why hasn't though forsaken me? I could hear the social discourses against this mother circulating: the patriarchal discourse of motherhood. All her life she dreamed of escaping the abuse she experienced at the hand of her stepfather and ignored by her mother. She dreamed of motherhood and reversing this. To be a good mother was all she wanted. Now she was told that her children needed a stepfather and that she was a neglectful mother. Her anger, rage and sadness at the

implication of this created the next potentially coercive discourse: the medical discourse of postnatal depression and her emotional unavailability to her children.

At the same time as the power of these discourses surround her, there is also the potentially liberating moment where an elemental intersubjectivity in the psychoanalytic space can engage in a powerful way. There is also a double reading, as Derrida would say, but with Foucault there is a double reading of social discourses, of the institutions which can be read as a text but can be reread – the violent moment can be deconstructed and can be turned into a liberating moment. This is the utopian ideal I hold onto. I think Foucault can be read as a form of idealism and I think it links to his recoiling from his

work being institutionalised and his joy in attempts to find style in using his work. This subjective moment is the most liberating part of Foucault's work, which gets stronger in his later writing.

My style here was to open a dialogue with social services and meet the chairman of the child protection conference. I explained that if the main risk was their concern about the bonding with the children then it was vital that I be able to give my view on this, and provide a visual report instead of a verbal report. This, to my knowledge, had never been done before in perinatal work. I didn't care. It was outrageous but directly my desire was to introduce a double reading into a system and not just in the consulting room. I rethought the concept of countertransference and

reapplied it as a systemic countertransference: that the whole professional system was in the grip of an enormous fixed projection from this mother's fear of being a bad mother onto the system.

I presented a small piece of video of her playing with her baby in front of twenty professionals at a child protection conference with the approval of this brilliant social worker who got it. This was unprecedented, and demonstrated the capacity of a system to have individual agency to change it. It took a lot of inspiration from Foucault to do this but I was clear in my aim to break the "silence of the asylum" and for her to speak, to be an active agent instead of an object of the gaze of these powerful discourses. Not only that, by showing her "interacting" with her baby, the

baby became a speaking subject in the room. What actually happened I didn't predict. Following the demonstration a dialogue began between the mother and the chairman of the conference. The other professionals became the audience and what they witnessed was a mother being able to speak about what she was doing and her capacity to think, feel and understand her children in a discourse that was more articulate and more nuanced than any of these professionals who were there to judge her.

Her own account was so powerful that she was able to, in my view, break the stranglehold of projections onto her and the child protection plan was removed with each professional voting to remove the plan. But I think this was only

achieved by being able to see the lines of power in the institutions first before being able to engage and change them. I have seen others attempting with the right intentions of doing the same after me but who failed because they did not have, in my view, a clear enough awareness of how power is distributed in the system. In one other case, even more powerful than this, despite all professionals voting to keep the mother on the child protection plan, the chairman removed the plan. The chair summarised by saying that the main reason for this plan was that the mother and the baby were not attached. It had been demonstrated by the presentation of the mother and the baby that this was not the case so the plan was removed.

So where is my Foucault?
Following Foucault I like to stay close to concrete demonstrations. Foucault's account of power is not a theory. It is never context-free but linked always to particular practices. In a sense, where is Foucault is like the question where is being or where is Christmas. It is in the doing and performing. Heidegger's first formulation for "Being" as an action was conveyed by the song "it is christmasing" in the *Hermeneutics of Facticity*, his first book on Being. This verbal sense of being continues right to the end in his later formulation of "the thing thinging" the therapy therapying, Foucault Foucaulting, power powering.

In the case I briefly mentioned there is the performance of this non-egalitarian ritual of power with the

social–institutional bodies. But in this concrete demonstration there is no map offered by Foucault. He described his approach to Dreyfus (in personal communication) as “a slalom between the traditional philosophy and the abandonment of all seriousness”. The true target of Foucault’s work was not power but the subject. In this I find his relevance for psychotherapy and particularly in practices that divide us. He said: “I have studied the objectivizing of the subject in what I shall call dividing practices. The subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This process objectivizes him. Examples are the made and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’.”

Foucault makes a nice distinction between “relationships of

communication” between partners and power relations and that these relationships can have an impact and produce effects of power. In this I see an emancipatory impulse in Foucault’s work that is important in the practice of psychotherapy in whatever local formation it manifests itself. For me, doing Foucault in therapy is in the analysis of power relations as step 1 in the whole context. Step 2 then becomes relationship struggle towards liberating episodes as the the heart of the practice of psychotherapy. Foucault writes: “most important is obviously the relationship of power relations and confrontation strategies. For if it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a permanent condition of their existence there is an insubordination and a certain essential

obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight.”

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Philadelphia Association

Studies
Training
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LEAFLET (1974) PHILADELPHIA ASSOCIATION

Extracts from Articles of Association

To relieve mental illness of all descriptions, in particular schizophrenia.

To undertake, and further, research into the causes of mental illness, the means of its detection and prevention, and its treatment.

To provide, and further, the provision of residential accommodation for persons suffering or who have suffered from mental illness.

To provide financial assistance for poor patients.

To promote and organise training in the treatment of schizophrenia and other forms of mental illness.

To hold seminars, conferences and summer schools.

To publish and subsidise publications having any relevance to the objects of the Association.

Our Articles of Association state our purposes in terms appropriate to our existence as a Charity.

We aim to change the way the "facts" of "mental health" and "mental illness" are seen by many people.

This is more than a new hypothesis inserted into an existing field of research and therapy; it is a proposal to change our whole way of seeing the issues.

Dwelling

There are 7 community households in London. Their accommodation varies from seven to eleven rooms.

It is our concern that these households be asylums, sanctuaries, and places of hospitality.

From participation in this venture a hitherto only tentatively glimpsed and hoped for strength and comfort has emerged. In the comparative absence of complex institutional structures, people are more willing than might be expected to be open with each other.

For those who live there, whatever their roles, these dwellings are crucibles where preconceptions are melted down in the direct experience of the wear and tear, agony and joy, excitement and boredom, hope and despair, of living together.

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Study Programme

Our lectures, seminars, study-groups and workshops are a forum where members, associates, students, friends and visitors share their understanding of the world.

The path followed is a phenomenological one, based on what we learn from a critique of our experience. Studies and practices include anthropology, Hatha Yoga, literature, music, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, Zen . . . seeking, perhaps through indirection, to come to ourselves.

Some of the themes discussed in previous meetings are (1) Lived Space; (2) The Body Image in an Anthropological Landscape; (3) Embryological Consciousness; (4) "Birthing" Workshops; (5) Community; (6) Theoretical Practice; (7) On Finding Oneself in the World; (8) The Logic of Transcendence; (9) Relation, Presence and Absence; (10) Selected Scriptures.

Study Programme Committee:

Dr. Hugh Crawford.
Mrs. Haya Oakley.
Mr. Paul Zeal.

Convenors:

Mrs. Haya Oakley.
Mr. Paul Zeal.

Registrar:

Michael Guy Thompson.

Psychotherapy Training

Knowledge, to be therapeutic, must become real, be *realised*. In training, we emphasise the way truth is apprehended; not only *what* is said or read, but *how*. Knowledge belongs to the student, as his own, in the first place; he or she *re-cognizes* rather than "learns."

Students are encouraged to seek the basic principles of therapy and with their roots, as it were, in these principles to be flexible, and to attend to physical, emotional, mental and social phenomena as they arise. Our training is mainly by apprenticeship. Either personal analysis or weekly supervision must be with a member of the Philadelphia Association.

There is no fixed length to the training, tailored, as it is, to the needs of each student. Some of the themes discussed in seminars and workshops are (1) the theory and classical texts of phenomenology; (2) the study of psycho-therapeutic theory and practice, especially Freud, Jung, Melanie Klein, Winnicott; (3) hermeneutics and the study of symbols, dreams, myths; (4) dynamics of small groups, e.g. families. Students are encouraged to play a part in the activities of the Philadelphia Association community households.

Training committee:

Hugh Crawford, M.B., Ch.B., F.R.C.P.(C).
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From June 1965 to September 1974

316 people,

197 men

119 women

have stayed in our households

of the 316

142

80 men

62 women

had been psychiatric in-patients

of the 316

288,

182 men

108 women

have left

the usual length of stay has been between three months and one year

of the

288 who left

29

all of whom had been psychiatric in-patients

9 men

20 women

have been back in hospital once, or more, since leaving, as far as we know

NEW ANIMATION: “MUSIC & CLOWNS”



ALEX WIDDOWSON

Trailer: vimeo.com/275563645

My brother, Jamie, has a profound learning disability. Despite being close to nonverbal he demonstrates charisma, a sharp sense of humour and incredible emotional sensitivity. In this project I team up with my parents to discuss what it’s like caring for someone with Down syndrome. We piece together fragments of insight to gain a sense of his inner life but our differing perspectives reveal as much about our own subjectivity as they do Jamie’s.

The UK has a critical under-representation of the ordinary and diverse lives of people with Down syndrome. As prenatal screening tests improve I feel an urgency to create rich and thoughtful portraits of the Down syndrome community, so people have more than a diagnosis to inform their decision of whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.





OPEN STUDIO
ALISON DAVIES

You are invited to my Open Studio on the last 2 weekends of July (21st–22nd, 28th–29th), any time between 11–6pm.

You will be able to see my paintings, collages, prints and some sculpture.

27 Priory Road, Cambridge CB5 8HT.

On Sundays there is free parking outside the house.

On Sunday 22nd July from 6pm onwards, there will be drinks and nibbles in the garden.

All welcome.

It would be lovely to see anyone who wants a day out in Cambridge. There are several other artists close by to visit also.



SANITY, MADNESS AND THE FAMILY 2
FILM SEASON

SANITY, MADNESS AND THE FAMILY, SEASON 2, AUG-DEC 2018

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**10 August: *Late
Spring* (Ozu, 1949)**

**9 November: *Fear
Eats the Soul*
(Fassbinder, 1974)**

**14 September: *The
Reckless Moment*
(Ophüls, 1949)**

**14 December: *The Damned*
(Visconti, 1969)**

**12 October: *All
That Heaven Allows*
(Sirk, 1955)**

**DOORS OPEN AT 6.30PM, FILM
STARTS AT 7.15PM, FOLLOWED
BY GROUP DISCUSSION**

FREE ENTRY